

On the System of Substantive Clauses in Ancient Greek A Functional Approach*)

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1. Classical Greek has several formal devices to build subordinate substantive clauses: 1. infinitive, 2. *ὅτι* or *ὡς* with a finite verb,¹⁾ 3. participle, 4. *ὅπως* with a future, 5. *μή* with a subjunctive, and 6. the so-called indirect questions. Those devices share one feature: they provide an obligatory complementation to the governing verb. Such a type of complementation is called obligatory or necessary in the sense that it is required by the verbal lexeme previously chosen by the speaker. That is, once the speaker has selected such verbs as *ἰδῶ*, *φημί*, *κελεύω*, *δύναμαι*, *ἔχω*, *ἡγοῦμαι* or *λέγω*, he is compelled by the linguistic system to add a complementizer, unless it can be inferred from the context or from the extra-linguistic environment. Theoretically at least, such a complementizer may be expressed in several ways: a noun-case, an adverb, or any of the above devices to build substantive clauses; but, in any case, at least one of them must be explicitly stated for the linguistic message to be sound and intelligible. For instance, if we say *what are you asking for?*, *what* must be seen as an obligatory complementation, because it must be stated for the utterance to be full and complete; but if we take *it is cold in winter*, *in winter* only depends on the content the speaker wishes to specify, and it needs not be stated for the intelligibility of the sentence. The point I am trying to make is that, at the syntactic level, two kinds of complementation must be distinguished:

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¹⁾ Other conjunctions such as *ὅ*, *ὄννεκα*, *ὄθούνεκα*, and *διότι* are also used to introduce substantive clauses, although they are restricted to some dialects or literary genres (cf. P. Monteil, 1963).

the former—labelled as an obligatory one—is predictable once some given verbs are selected for the message; the latter—labelled as a free or optional expansion—is not predictable, and its presence is only determined by the content the speaker wishes to put forward.²⁾

Taking the identity of the syntactic value expressed by the various kinds of complementizers as a starting point, my purpose is to ascertain whether those formal devices (be they free or conditioned by the governing verb) are empty of meaning, or rather, if they make up a system of meaningful oppositions. That is to say, which of the following possibilities of relationship between the different formal procedures of building substantive clauses is valid?

a) the formal devices are empty of meaning, and the speaker (or writer) chooses one of them at random or according to a stylistic preference. It is in this way that the shifts between infinitive and *ὅπως* with a future governed by *δεῖ*, *βουλεύομαι*, *σκοπῶ* and so on, are generally understood;

b) the formal devices of complementizers are empty of meaning but conditioned by the governing verb; if so, a fixed form of complementizer is needed once the main verb is given. As a matter of fact, there are many verbs which only allow one class of substantive clauses;

c) they are meaningful, but their form is conditioned by the main verb; if so, the formal devices used to state substantive clauses will be arranged according to the principle of complementary distribution; in this case, both the meaning of the governing verb and that of the substantive clause are to be understood as redundant;

d) finally, all or some formal devices are distributed according to free arrangement, and carry distinctive meanings. If it can be shown that the choice of the substantive construction depends on the wish to state distinctive and opposing meanings, it will be then necessary to account for the fact that only one form of substantive clauses is attested after many Greek verbs.

In this paper I shall pay special attention to the alternation between infinitive / *ὅτι* or *ὡς* with a finite verb. I shall not be concerned with either the factors determining the choice between *ὅτι*

²⁾ It is beyond the scope of this paper to set up theoretical distinctions between obligatory complements and peripheral elements; for a thorough discussion, see Matthews (1981: 121 ff.).

or *ὥς* (cf. R. Neuberger-Donath, 1982), or with the origin and development of the *accusativus cum infinitivo*.

The view I shall try to set out is that the formal devices used to build substantive clauses are not synonymous; the speaker or writer do make a choice between the various forms of substantive clauses according to the meaning they wish to put forward. I shall endeavour to show that *ἄτι-* and *ὥς-*clauses have some semantic restrictions which do not apply to infinitive clauses.

For this purpose, the apposite approach is a functional one based on a combinatory analysis. Accordingly, in order to find out the meaning carried by the infinitive and the *ἄτι-/ὥς-*clauses, the following points should be taken account of:

a) the place the infinitive takes in the verbal paradigm in relation to the finite verb;

b) the alternation between infinitive and *ἄτι-* or *ὥς-*clauses depending on the same verb, provided that some change of meaning can be detected;

c) finally, in the light of the results arrived at, it will be necessary to explain the absence of some classes of substantive clauses after some given verbs.

2. Judging from the way the handbooks of Greek syntax deal with substantive clauses, we are entitled to assume that the formal devices are empty of meaning, conditioned by the main verb, and distributed according to the principle of their complementarity. Thus, it is said that

1) after verbs of willing (*κελεύω, βούλομαι*), of being able to (*δύναμαι, οἷός τ' εἶμι*), of duty (*δεῖ, πρέπει*), and of happening (*συμβαίνει, συμπίπτει*), an infinitive is needed except for some instances we shall refer to below;

2) the verbs of fearing (*φοβοῦμαι, δέδοικα*) are constructed with *μή* and a subjunctive;

3) the *verba sentiendi* (*ὄρω, αἰσθάνομαι, ἀκούω*) take as a rule a participle or an *ἄτι-*clause;

4) after the *verba declarandi* and *dicendi* (*λέγω, ἀγγέλλω*) an *ἄτι-/ὥς-*clause, a participle or an infinitive can be used;

5) after the *verba affectuum* (*χαίρω, αἰσχύνομαι*) either a participle or a clause introduced by *ἄτι* or *ὥς* is found;

6) and the verbs of intention or purpose (*πειροῶμαι, ἐπιμελοῦμαι*) usually take *ὅπως* with a future or, sometimes, an infinitive.

Therefore, the way the substantive clauses are dealt with leads us to assume, at first sight at least, that the use of one or other subordinating device only depends on the semantic class the main verb belongs to. It is at most conceded that, if the form of the substantive clause has a meaning of its own, such a meaning is redundant with regard to the one carried by the main verb. That the meaning of *ὄτι*-/*ὡς*-clauses and of the infinitive is tantamount is argued by J. Humbert (1960: 183).

Such an approach has been taken to its utmost consequences in Lightfoot's discussion of complementation in Greek. According to Lightfoot (1975),³⁾ formal devices of complementation are synonymous in so far as they are empty of meaning; their distribution arises from the so-called 'lexical' rules of the main verb. The only exception are *ὅπως*-clauses with a future, in which the verbal tense adds a new semantic feature that is not available in the remaining complementation devices. His view is based on the actual alternations of complementation devices without change of meaning after the same verb, on the historical changes of complementation devices after some verbs, and on instances such as:

Hdt. VI 63,2 *καὶ τίς οἱ τῶν οἰκετέων . . . ἐξαγγέλλει ὡς οἱ παῖς γέγονε.* — 65,3 *τότε ὅτε οἱ ἐξήγγειλε ὁ οἰκέτης παῖδα γεγονέναι.* — 69,4 *ὅτε αὐτῶ σὺ ἠγγέλθης γεγενημένος.*

Thuc. VIII 78 *οἱ . . . στρατιῶται . . . διεβόων ὡς . . . φθείρεται τὰ πράγματα . . . : τὸν δ' αὖ Τισσαφέρην τὰς τε ναῦς ταύτας σὺ κομίζειν, καὶ τροφήν ὅτι σὺ ξυνεχῶς σὺδ' ἐντελῆ διδοῦς κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν.*

But there is also evidence of differences in meaning between *ὄτι*-clauses and infinitive after a governing *verbum declarandi* as it is seen for instance in: *P 654 ὄτρυνον δ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ δαΐφροσι θᾶσσον ἰόντα / εἰπεῖν ὅτι ῥά οἱ πολὺ φίλτατος ὦλεθ' ἑταῖρος.* — *ο 75 ἀλλὰ μὲν εἰς δ κε δῶρα φέρων ἐπιδίφροια θείω / καλά, σὺ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδης, εἶπω δὲ γυναιξὶ / δεῖπνον ἐνὶ μεγάροις τετυκεῖν ἄλις ἔνδον ἐόντων.*

To get rid of the evidence, Lightfoot assumes that we must reckon with the existence of a pair of homonymous verbs both for *λέγω* and *ἀγγέλλω*, and so on: the first element of each pair would mean 'to state,' 'to utter,' and the second one 'to order,' 'to command.' It goes without saying that such an *ad hoc* assumption is open to objection. On the contrary, it can be seen that the infinitive construction transforms an impressive utterance into a subordinated

³⁾ Lightfoot follows the method and accepts the results arrived at by R.T. Lakoff (1968) in his book on Latin complementation.

clause, whereas *ὄτι*-clauses are used whenever a declarative utterance or sentence is to be converted into a subordinate clause. Our hypothesis is more economical and, therefore, must be preferred from the very point of view of transformational procedures. Lightfoot's assumption would lead to the multiplication of lexical entries in the lexicon. However, as we can see, a single syntactic rule allows us to simplify quite a large amount of lexical data.

3. Moreover, some complementation devices can be asserted as having meanings of their own. Thus, Kühner-Gerth (II 1, p. 48, § 481.1) account for the choice between participle-clauses and infinitive with the following words: "Während der Infinitiv etwas ausspricht, was erst mit dem regierenden Verb eintritt, bezeichnet das Partizip etwas, was zugleich mit dem regierenden Verb da ist." In the like way, according to G. de Boel (1980: 295), participle-clauses are only used "with an existential presupposition."

As for the meaning expressed, the indirect questions are also used in opposition with the remaining complementation devices.

Substantive clauses with *ὅπως* and a future are generally regarded as conditioned by the governing verb. However, the evidence from the classical Attic, as assembled by S. Amigues (1977), shows that such a formal device is usual after those classes of verbs which more or less frequently take the infinitive. Thus, *ὅπως* with a future as a substantive clause is found after:

— verbs of thinking or of opinion: *βουλεύεσθαι, διανοεῖσθαι, ἐνθυμεισθαι, σκοπεῖν, σκέπτεσθαι, ἐλπίζειν, ἐπιβουλεύειν, φροντίζειν, τηρεῖν, προνοεῖν, προσέχειν.*

— verbs of willing: *μέλειν, πειρᾶσθαι, φυλάττειν, πείθειν, αἰτεῖν, δεῖσθαι, κωλύειν, παρακελεύεσθαι, ἀμελεῖν, σπουδάζειν.*

— verbs of ability: *ποιεῖν, πράττειν, ἀσκεῖν.*

— verbs of duty: *δεῖ.*

— *verba sentiendi*: *ὄρᾶν, βλέπειν, ἀθρεῖν.*

— verbs of fearing: *φοβεῖσθαι.*

The evidence suggests that *ὅπως* with a future as a substantive clause is only a paradigmatic variant of the infinitive, and that the difference between them lies in the fact that *ὅπως* + future includes the semantic feature of future tense, which fails to be expressed in most cases by the infinitive. Particularly outstanding with regard to the relation of both constructions are the verbs of willing (*βούλομαι, κελεύω*) and of duty (*δεῖ*); they have a semantic constraint

(cf. A. M. Bolkestein, 1976), according to which the very semantic content they bear prevents the governed verb from being related to the past; on the contrary, it is usually related to the future. None the less, those verbs are not allowed to take an infinitive of future, some exceptions left aside (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 293f.; as to *μέλλω*, cf. Basset, 1979). Therefore, it can be assumed that *δπως* with a future specifies the tense of the governed verb, which usually remains unexpressed by the infinitive but is semantically conditioned by the main verb.

To sum up, the existence of meaningful oppositions expressed by at least some subordinate constructions leads us to state that the infinitive and *δτι-/ώς*-clauses are not synonymous variants (either free or in complementary distribution), but elements belonging to the system of meaningful oppositions used for the expression of substantive clauses.

4. This is the view held by H. Fournier (1946), H. Kurzová (1968, 1970) and, recently, by G. de Boel (1980). According to Fournier (1946: 174), “la complétive formule donc, avec *δτι* des faits positifs et contrôlables, avec *ώς* des faits interprétés par le sujet, avec l’infinitif la croyance du sujet — sincère ou feinte — au fait énoncé. Fait déclaré, fait allégué, fait admis, telles sont les nuances des trois types complétifs.” H. Kurzová distinguishes two semantic values in the infinitive of the classical age: on the one hand, the “dynamic” infinitive, which is not concerned with the expression of the actually existing state of affairs (*κελεύει ἔναι*), and which is not far from the ancient infinitive of purpose and result; on the other hand, the declarative or referential infinitive, which states a subjective meaning and is therefore the marked form, whereas clauses introduced by *δτι* or *ώς* are the unmarked form in so far as they are a pure transformation of a main sentence into a governed one. Leaving aside the development assumed from the IE infinitive, we must emphasize that the infinitive is also used as a substantive clause indicating the reality of the action expressed. Let one example suffice: Hdt. VIII 50, 1 *ταῦτα τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου στρατηγῶν ἐπιλεγομένων ἐηλύθεε ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος ἀγγέλλων ἦκειν τὸν βάρβαρον ἐς τὴν Ἄττικὴν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσαν προπολέεσθαι*. The evidence suggests that the infinitive can express objective actions which are referred to the actual state of affairs.

Recently, the opposition between infinitive and *δτι*- or *ώς*-clauses has been explained by G. de Boel (1980: 293) as follows: “never

does the infinitive presuppose an actually existing state of affairs.” “We have found two general classes of complementizers: on the one hand, *ὄτι/ὥς* and the participle are used whenever there is an existential presupposition . . . On the other hand, the infinitive and the AcI [*i.e. accusativus cum infinitivo*] are used whenever there is no existential presupposition” (1980: 300). While acknowledging the adequacy of such an approach, it is still necessary to merge the theory of substantive clauses into the theory of the verbal categories and of the sentence functions.

5. As it was said above, we shall consider (a) the place of the infinitive in the verbal paradigm, (b) the alternations between infinitive and *ὄτι-/ὥς*-clauses after the same verb, and (c) the ground why some complementizers types do not exist after some verbs.

5.1. It is well known that the IE infinitive is a verbal noun which progressively acquired the grammatical categories of the finite verb. Nonetheless such a development did not reach its end in the sense that, besides its indifference as to person and number, infinitives are sometimes neutral with regard to diathesis (cf. Schwyzler, I 805, 809) and grammatical tense (cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner, 296f.). All this prompts us to suppose that *ὄτι-/ὥς*-clauses, since they are expressed by means of a finite verb, must have a more restricted meaning than the infinitive, because the latter lacks some verbal categories.

Instances of *ὄτι* or *ὥς* followed by an infinitive do support the view that the infinitive is something like the rest-form—that is to say the unmarked form to build a substantive clause whenever the construction started by has been forgotten, or whenever the conjunction—no matter for what reason—fails to receive a finite verb (cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 2, p. 357, § 550.3): Xen., *Cyr.* II 4, 15 ἀκούω ὄτι καὶ συνθηρεντάς τινας τῶν παίδων σοι γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ. — Isaeus, VI 10 προσδιαμεμαρτύρηκεν ὥς υἱὸν εἶναι γνήσιον . . . τοῦτον.

But what turns out to be conclusive in order to ascertain the relation between *ὄτι-/ὥς*-clauses and the infinitive is this: from a functional point of view, the infinitive is used in messages belonging both to the assertive function of the language and to the impressive one, whereas the indicative is only attested in utterances belonging to the assertive function. By saying that a sentence belongs to the impressive function, I mean that the sentence referred to is uttered to report an order, command or prohibition; therefore, it is not defined as to the logical truth value. The forms taken by the verb

in such sentences are the imperative, the optative (without *ἄν*), the subjunctive (without *ἄν* too) or the infinitive. On the other hand, a sentence belonging to the assertive function states the truth value of the proposition (real, unreal, potential, prospective); the verbal forms of such utterances are different. Impressive function is not concerned with the moods distinguished in the declarative function of the communication. Therefore, the term 'mood,' as used in the grammatical tradition, conveys different meanings, and refers to the functions of the language and to how the assertion is made. That is why those two classes of 'moods' must be taken separately. Accordingly, for the sake of convenience, I shall call the modal distinctions which state the truth value of the message 'moods,' and the differences depending on the functional purpose of the language 'modalities.'

As to the main sentences, the infinitive appears to be used in the impressive modality. Infinitive in the sense of imperative is attested in instances such as (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 380f.): E 261 *σὺ δὲ τούσδε μὲν ὠκέας ἵππους / αὐτοῦ ἐρουκακέειν*. Impressive modality is also seen in the *accusativus cum infinitivo* reporting a wish (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 382f.): H 179 *Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ Αἴαντα λαχεῖν ἢ Τυδῆος υἷόν*. — ρ 354 *Ζεῦ ἄνα, Τηλέμαχόν μοι ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιον εἶναι, / καὶ οἱ πάντα γένοιτο ὅσα φρεσὶν ἦσι μενοιναῖ*. None the less the indicative is not attested in sentences entailing impressive modality. The only examples of *indicativus pro imperativo* are found in the future (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 291): Plat. *Prot.*, 338a *ὡς οὖν ποιήσετε καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι*. — Φ 60 *ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ δουρὸς ἀκωκῆς ἡμετέροιο / γεύσεται*. About the above examples, it is to be pointed out that the future (with *δπως*) is the only indicative form the infinitive alternates with to build a substantive clause (§ 3). Furthermore the future exhibits a set of semantic features which are shared by the moods and are foreign to the indicative.⁴⁾

In the subordination, the semantic content of the impressive modality is expressed by the infinitive governed by such verbs as *κελεύω, αἰτῶ, δεῖ, ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀναγκάζω, παρακελεύομαι, χροῖ, κωλύω, βούλομαι, ἐθέλω, ποθῶ, εὔχομαι, ἀξιῶ, σπουδάζω, σπεύδω, ἐπείγομαι, ὀρέγομαι, δικαιῶ, γλίχομαι, ζητῶ, προσθυμοῦμαι, ἐπιχειρῶ, πειρῶμαι, μελετῶ, βουλευομαι, ἐπιβουλεύω*. The above verbs take a substantive clause consisting of an infinitive or *δπως* + future (the single indicative tense susceptible of appearing in a sentence of the impressive

⁴⁾ The impressive function expressed by the future is perhaps derived from the context and not grammatically stated.

function), but never an *ὄτι*-/*ὡς*-clause. The rule can only be explained once it is taken into account that the indicative is not used in sentences belonging to the impressive modality.

Furthermore, the subordinated infinitive is also used in sentences of the declarative modality, when it is governed by such verbs as *νομίζω*, *συμβαίνει*, *γινώσκω*, *ἠγοῦμαι* and the like. Therefore, whereas the indicative (with the single exception of the future) is only used in the assertive function, the infinitive is indifferent as to the expression of the modality. That is why it is found both in the assertive and the impressive sentences.

5.2. A survey of instances in which both kinds of substantive clauses can be used after the same verb leads us to the conclusion previously referred to: infinitives can occur in the impressive and declarative modalities, but indicatives are only found reporting declarative sentences. The infinitive transforms an impressive message into subordination, whereas the indicative after *ὄτι*/*ὡς* reports a declarative sentence in indirect speech: Thuc., VIII 19,2 *καὶ ἐλθούσης παρὰ Χαλκιδέως ἀγγελίας αὐτοῖς ἀποπλεῖν πάλιν, καὶ ὄτι Ἀμόργης παρέσται κατὰ γῆν στρατιᾶ, ἔπλευσαν ἐς Διὸς ἱερόν*. On the other hand, the assertive value of the infinitive is often attested; as a matter of fact, coordination of an infinitive with *ὄτι*-/*ὡς*-clauses is often found (cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 2, p. 35, § 550.2): Thuc., III 25,1 *καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς προέδροις ὄτι ἐσβολή τε ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔσται καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες παρέσονται ἃς ἔδει βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς, προαποπεμφθῆναί τε αὐτὸς τούτων ἔνεκα καὶ ἅμα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελησόμενος*. No difference in meaning can be detected between both substantive clauses in the above example; neither is the infinitive more 'subjective' than the *ὄτι*-clause. Let us see some other instances. The infinitive reporting an impressive message in indirect speech is usually found after *εἶπον* from Homer onwards: *α* 37 *ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἶπομεν ἡμεῖς | Ἐρμείαν πέμψαντες, ἐϋσκοπον Ἀργεῖφόντην, | μήτ' αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάσθαι ἄκοιτιν*. — *θ* 433 *ὡς ἔφατ', Ἀρήτη δὲ μετὰ δμωῆσιν ἔειπεν | ἀμφὶ πυρὶ στῆσαι τρίποδα μέγαν ὄτι τάχιστα*. There are also three instances in Homer (*N* 666f., *Σ* 9ff., *Ω* 113) of assertive infinitive governed by *εἶπον*, as well as some others in which *ὄτι*-/*ὡς*-clauses report an assertive message in indirect speech (*P* 411, 655, *π* 131, *P* 642, *X* 439, *χ* 373, *ο* 158).

Curiously enough, LSJ *s. v.* *προφωνέω* postulate a second meaning 'order beforehand' or 'before all' besides 'utter, declare beforehand,' in order to account for Soph., *Ai.* 1089 *καὶ σοι προφωνῶ τόνδε μὴ*

θάπτειν and Eur., *Hipp.* 956; *El.* 685, with an infinitive too. No doubt, the meaning 'order' does not lie in the main verb, but in the form of the subordinated clause.

5.3. In the light of the conclusions reached so far there is now the possibility of accounting for the absence of *δτι-/ώς*-clauses after such verbs as *κελεύω*, *αἰτῶ*, *παρακελεύομαι*. As it is well known, verbs of willing (*βούλομαι*, *ἐπιχειρῶ*, *ἄξιῶ*, *σπονδάζω*), of being able to (*δύναμαι*, *οἶός τ' εἶμι*), of duty (*δεῖ*, *πρέπει*, *χρή*) never take substantive clauses with *δτι-/ώς* and a finite verb. The reason is clear: the dependent clause is always a transformation of an impressive utterance into a subordinate clause. On the other hand, among the semantic set of verbs which usually take an infinitive, verbs of thinking (*νομίζω*, *ὑπολαμβάνω*, *οἶμαι*) and of saying are the only subset capable of governing an *δτι-/ώς*-clause. As to the verbs of thinking, the modality of the depending sentence is assertive; that is why they can take both subordinate constructions. As to the *verba dicendi*, it was suggested above that their substantive clauses with *δτι-/ώς* and a finite verb belong to the assertive function of the language, whereas those expressed by means of infinitive report in indirect speech messages belonging to the assertive as well as to the impressive modalities. To sum up, infinitives report both impressive and declarative messages by means of subordination; *δτι-/ώς*-clauses are only found when declarative messages are reported.

6. It still remains to try to explain the fact that the infinitive is the usual device to build substantive clauses after verbs of thinking, and the occasional one after *verba dicendi* and *sentiendi*. As a matter of fact, those semantic classes of verbs are always (or may be) used to report messages connected with the assertive modality. Why are then *δτι-/ώς*-clauses so scarcely attested after *ἠγοῦμαι*, *δοκεῖ*, *διανοοῦμαι* and the like (cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 2, p. 356, § 550.1), instead of being their regular construction or, at least, the most frequent one? It is true that the infinitive cannot be regarded as being against the rule, since it is the unmarked form as far as the modality of the sentence is concerned; but the scarcity of *δτι-/ώς*-clauses along with those semantic classes of verbs is surprising. Therefore, the evidence compels us to make an inquiry into the function of the infinitive as a formal device to build substantive clauses reporting a message of assertive modality. In order to account for the evidence the following points should be made.

6.1. Utterances belonging to the impressive modality are not concerned with the truth value; in the sense pointed out above they lack grammatical mood, because what we call 'mood' is only referred to the means of indicating the attitude of the speaker towards his statement. Thus no mood is expressed by the infinitive, at least when used in an impressive context. The above leads us to suppose that, in order to avoid the assumption that the infinitive has two meanings (with and without mood, depending on whether the governing verb refers to an assertive or an impressive message), infinitives governed by verbs of thinking, *sentiendi* and *dicendi* do not express grammatical mood either. If this suggestion is right, we are led to assume that the infinitive has nothing to do with the way the speaker relates his message to the actual state of affairs. I shall henceforth try to find support for this assumption.

6.2. Historical reasons favour the view that the infinitive lacks modal expression; in fact, historical grammar deals separately with finite and non-finite verbs (so Schwyzer-Debrunner, 302f.). But what in this paper deserves our attention is the synchronic point of view.

The recurrence of infinitives with *ἄν* seems to run against the hypothesis I am arguing for. As early as in Homer there is one⁵⁾ instance of infinitive with *ἄν*: *I 684 καὶ δ' ἄν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἔφη παραμυθήσασθαι | οἴκαδ' ἀποπλείειν*, which reports the direct speech of *I 417 καὶ δ' ἄν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἐγὼ παραμυθησαίμην | οἴκαδ' ἀποπλείειν*. From Homer onwards infinitives with *ἄν* become more frequent (cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 2, p. 240f., § 398.1). Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the ability of the infinitive to be joined to *ἄν* does not mean that infinitives without *ἄν* convey modal meanings. Likewise, participles and even adjectives have sometimes taken *ἄν* from the V century B.C. onwards, but neither does it mean that as a rule adjectives without *ἄν* indicate modal meanings. The particle *ἄν* causes infinitives to have a modal sense; if *ἄν* is not added, infinitives are not concerned with the meanings involved in modal categories; accordingly, they will be real, prospective, potential or unreal depending on the context. It is the established analogy between the indicative as used for the direct report of statements and the infinitive of the corresponding subordination (indirect report) that has given rise to the belief that the infinitive without *ἄν* indicates modal reality; but there is no morpheme by means of which the

⁵⁾ P. Chantraine (1953: 311) also discusses X 108ff. and rejects its validity.

infinitive is referred to the actually existing state of affairs. Just as the unreal mood of the infinitive in instances such as *ἔδει σε ἐλθεῖν*, or *Ψ 546 ἀλλ' ὄφελεν ἀθανатоῖσιν εὐχεσθαι* depends on the context (particularly on the verbal tense), in the same way the real mood of the infinitive results from the whole of the sentence, not from the infinitive form.

Infinitive with *ἄν* explicitly expresses non-real mood; infinitive without *ἄν* may correspond to any grammatical mood whatever. Hence it can be understood as unreal: Thuc., I 38,5 *καλὸν δ' ἦν, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἶξαι τῇ ἡμετέρῃ δόρῃ*;

potential: Thuc. IV 24,4 *εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Πήγιον ἡλιζον περὶ τε καὶ ναυσὶν ἐφορμοῦντες ῥαδίως χειρώσασθαι, καὶ ἤδη σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίνεσθαι* (cf. Gomme, *ad loc.*). *χειρώσασθαι* CEG, *-σασθαι* ABFM, but see *γίνεσθαι*.

prospective: Thuc., VI 49,1–2 *Λάμαχος δὲ ἀντικρὺς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν . . . τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι· ἦν δὲ χρονίση πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον. αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἦν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς προσδέχονται, μάλιστα ἄν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ πάντα ἄν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι . . .*

The parallel wording of the sentence—with the only exception that the former infinitive lacks the *ἄν* stated before the latter—is striking.

We must emphasize that instances of this sort are far from being scarcely attested; on the contrary, a great deal of examples are gathered in Kühner-Gerth, II 1, p. 195ff. Let it suffice to quote a few: Xen., *Cyr.*, VI 1,19 *τειχος, ἦν ἐπιτρέψωσιν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τειχίσασθαι ἔφασαν.*⁶) — Hdt., VIII 86 *ἐδόκεε τε ἕκαστος ἕωντόν θεήσασθαι βασιλέα.*⁷) — Thuc., II 3,2 *καὶ ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαδίως κρατῆσαι (κρατήσειν Aeneas Tacticus)*. According to the rule proposed by Madvig a long time ago, the *textus receptus* is usually emended, and the aorist infinitive is replaced by the future; sometimes the particle *ἄν* is added, as, for example, in Thuc., VI 24,1 *νομίζων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ἀποτρέψειν ἢ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μάλιστα (ἄν) οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι*. — Thuc., III 24,1 *νομίζοντες ἤμισα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑποτοπήσαι τραπέσθαι (Madvig ἤμιστ' (ἄν))*. Once the rule is taken for granted, since metre makes poetic texts more difficult to alter than those written in prose, the assumption

⁶) Emended into *τειχιεῖσθαι* in the Oxford text by Marchant.

⁷) Other readings are *θηήσεσθαι, θηήσασθαι*.

is made that metrical convenience explains the absence of *ἄν* (cf. e.g. Aesch., *Prom.* 663ff.; Soph., *El.* 443; *Trach.* 1160; Eur., *Or.* 1527).⁸⁾ Nonetheless, in the light of the above said, there is no reason to emend the *textus receptus*.

6.3. The analogy found in the constructions of the consecutive clauses is enlightening. As it is well known, *ὥστε* + infinitive indicates not only the actual result of the action referred to by the main verb, as *ὥστε* + indicative, but also consequences in which nothing is said about their relation to the actual state of affairs (cf. Schwyzer-Debrunner, 677f.). That means that the infinitive indicates no mood whatsoever; it is the context what makes it clear how the action expressed by the infinitive is related to the actually existing state of affairs. For the rest, the infinitive with *ἄν* is used in the same way, and it is the modal particle that explicitly specifies the non-real meaning. The analogy with the infinitive as used in substantive clauses is striking.

6.4. The opposition between infinitive and participle-clauses after a large group of verbs must be regarded as a consequence from the meaning conveyed by each form. Thus, *γινώσκω* is said to mean 'to know' when it governs a participle-clause, but *iudicare, existimare* when constructed with infinitive. Analogous distinctions are established for *ὄρω*, *πυνθάνομαι*, *αἰσθάνομαι*, *συγγινώσκω*, *οἶδα*, *ἐπίσταμαι*, *νομίζω*, *μανθάνω*, *μιμνήσκομαι*, *ἐπιλανθάνομαι*, *λογίζομαι*, *φαίνομαι*, *δείκνυμι*, *ἀποφαίνω*, *δηλῶ*, *ὁμολογῶ*, *ποιῶ*, *καθίζω*, *καθίσταμαι*, *αἰσχύνομαι*, *αἰδοῦμαι*, *ἄρκῶ*, *ικανός εἰμί*, *ἀνέχομαι*, *ὑπομένω*, *τολμῶ*, *περιορῶ*, *ἄρχομαι* and many others (cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 2, p. 68ff., § 484). It is also said that *ἔοικε* with a participle should be translated 'erscheinen,' and with an infinitive 'scheinen'; *ἀκούω* is said to mean "c. gen. et part. von einer unmittelbaren, c. acc. et part. von einer zwar nur mittelbaren, aber sicheren und begründeten Wahrnehmung; c. inf. von einer nur als Gerücht (durch Hörensagen) übermittelten Kunde." As for *ἀγγέλλω*, it is said to mean "c. part. als Tatsache melden; c. inf. gerüchtweise melden."

Such differences in meaning (if they actually exist and are everywhere liable to verification) cannot derive from the main verb, but from the form taken by the substantive clause. Therefore, the se-

⁸⁾ The instances found in Thucydides, as assembled by Classen-Steup („Anhang“, II p. 287ff.), are: III 24,1; IV 13,1; 24, 4; 28,5; 36,1; 52,3; 80,1; VI 24,1; 24,3; VII 21,2; VIII 5,5. The Budé text by J. de Romilly generally prefers the *textus receptus*, against Stuart Jones' Oxford edition. A few further examples can be found in A. Ruiz de Elvira (1970).

mantic features arising from the form taken by the substantive clause can be regarded as the result of the following syntactic rule: participle-clauses state reality in a positive way, whereas infinitives are not provided with the meanings expressed by modal inflection; that is why it can be actualized as subjective, real, potential or unreal.

6.5. The verbs which give rise to a subordinated declarative sentence and are always or often constructed with an infinitive are the *verba sentiendi*, *dicendi* and *cogitandi*. It is precisely by means of those verbs that the sentences which logicians call opaque messages are formed. As G. Calboli (1978: 206ff.) has pointed out, there is a close relation between the infinitive being governed by such verbs and the opacity of their message. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to look closely into the semantic features of the opaque messages; but what is worth pointing out is that sentences governed by such verbs are ambiguous. They seem to be true in two different ways.

The peculiar semantic features of the classes of verbs which entail the opacity of their content is reflected by the formal device Greek language prefers to state their substantive clauses: the infinitive, by means of which the speaker does not state his attitude towards the assertion. *Ὅτι*-/*ὡς*-clauses, since they use a finite verb, indicate the mood of the governed clause; on the other hand, infinitives without modal particle lack the meanings conveyed by modal inflection.

7. The conclusions we have reached so far can be summarized as follows:

a) it was necessary to set up a distinction between modality of the sentence and mood of the verb; my claim is that by 'modal inflection' two facts of a different kind are meant: the function the sentence fulfills as an act of communication (assertive or impressive), and the way the speaker relates his statement to the actually existing state of affairs (real, unreal, potential, prospective). Modality is a matter of every kind of messages; mood or truth value is a matter only of the assertive modality. Since impressive modality indicates no truth value, it is not concerned with modal meanings;

b) substantive clauses expressed by means of infinitive can be governed both by verbs which transform a declarative statement into subordination and by verbs reporting an impressive message; on the contrary, *ὅτι*-/*ὡς*-clauses with a finite verb are only used in

sentences belonging to the assertive function of the language. Ὅπως with a future is a variant form alternating with infinitive; it specifies the future tense which is implied by the infinitive after the verbs of willing;

c) as to the assertive modality, the attitude of the speaker towards his statement is not expressed in the infinitive; it is the single context that conveys the mood by which the verbal action is related to the world. Infinitives with ἄν specify non-real mood, while ὅτι-/ὡς-clauses, in so far as they are stated by means of a finite verb, specify the mood.

To sum up, the infinitive is the modal neutral form for the expression of substantive clauses.

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The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the meaningful oppositions between the formal devices as used to construct substantive clauses in Ancient Greek. A functional approach is regarded as the apposite method; thus the evidence adduced is based on a) the place of the infinitive in the verbal paradigm; b) the alternation between infinitive and $\delta\tau\iota$ -/ $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ - clauses after the same verb; c) the ground why some classes of substantive clauses are not attested along with some verbs. On the basis of the above criteria, it is suggested that the infinitive is the modal neutral form for the expression of substantive clauses; accordingly, infinitives are not provided with the meanings carried by modal inflection.

On Hendiadys in Greek

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If one wishes to consult the standard discussion of the figure hendiadys in Greek, one is surprised to learn that such does not exist. While hendiadys in Latin has received extensive treatment,¹⁾ the figure is ignored in the Greek grammars of Kühner-Gerth, Schwyzer and Gildersleeve.²⁾ I cannot account for this omission in

¹⁾ Kühner-Stegmann, *Gramm. d. lat. Sprache: Satzlehre II*, ³1955, 26–7 and 578; Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lat. Gramm. II*, 1965, 782–3 with full bibliography.

²⁾ I have confirmed the fact that hendiadys is not treated in these grammars by checking all the instances of hendiadys that I have identified below in W.M. Calder III, *Index Locorum zu Kühner-Gerth*, Darmstadt 1965; E. Schwyzer, *Gr. Gramm. IV: Stellenregister*, Munich 1971; P. Stork, *Index of Passages Cited*, in: B.L. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, ²Groningen 1980. I have also checked K.H. Lee, *Index of Passages Cited in W. Breitenbach, Untersuchungen z. Sprache d. eurip. Lyrik*, Amsterdam 1979, and A. Kessels, *Stellenregister zu E. Bruhn, Anhang zu Sophokles*, Utrecht 1977. Hendiadys in Greek is recognized by H.W. Smyth, *A Greek Grammar*, New York 1920, § 3025 and J.D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, Oxford 1952, 35–6 and 62–3, but these discussions are very limited, and the fullest treatment is still that of Lobeck, in his note on Soph. Aj. 145. *Grammars of*